We show that the unification problem "is there a substitution instance of a given formula that is provable in a given logic?" is undecidable for basic modal logics K and K4 extended with the universal modality. It follows that the admissibility problem for inference rules is undecidable for these logics as well. These are the first examples of standard decidable modal logics for which the unification and admissibility problems are undecidable. We also prove undecidability of the unification and admissibility problems for K and K4 with at least two modal operators and nominals (instead of the universal modality), thereby showing that these problems are undecidable for basic hybrid logics. Recently, unification has been introduced as an important reasoning service for description logics. The undecidability proof for K with nominals can be used to show the undecidability of unification for Boolean description logics with nominals (such as ALCO and SHIQO). The undecidability proof for K with the universal modality can be used to show that the unification problem relative to role boxes is undecidable for Boolean description logics with transitive roles, inverse roles, and role hierarchies (such as SHI and SHIQ). 
INTRODUCTION
The unification (or substitution) problem for a propositional logic L can be formulated as follows: given a formula ϕ in the language of L, decide whether it is unifiable in L in the sense that there exists a uniform substitution s for the variables of ϕ such that s(ϕ) is provable in L. For normal modal logics, this problem is equivalent to the standard unification problem modulo equational theories [Baader and Siekmann 1994] : in this case the equational theory consists of any complete set of equations axiomatising the variety of Boolean algebras with operators and additional equations corresponding the axioms of L.
A closely related algorithmic problem for L is the admissibility problem for inference rules: given an inference rule ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n /ϕ, decide whether it is admissible in L, that is, for every substitution s, we have L s(ϕ) whenever L s(ϕ i ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It should be clear that if the admissibility problem for L is decidable, then the unification problem for L is decidable as well. Indeed, the rule ϕ/⊥ is not admissible in L iff there is a substitution s for which L s(ϕ). As was observed in Ghilardi [1999] , in some cases the admissibility problem can be reduced to the unification problem. More precisely, suppose that for a unifiable formula ϕ in L one can compute a finite complete set S of unifiers in the sense that each unifier s for ϕ in L is less general than some s ∈ S (i.e., there exists a substitution s such that L s( p) ↔ s (s ( p)), for all variables p in ϕ). Then to decide whether the rule ϕ/ψ is admissible in L it is enough to check whether L s (ψ) for all s ∈ S.
It follows from the results of V. Rybakov (see Rybakov [1997] and references therein) that the unification and admissibility problems are decidable for propositional intuitionistic logic and such standard ("transitive") modal logics as K4, GL, S4, S4.3. The computational complexity of the admissibility problem for these logics has been investigated in Jerabek [2007] . For example, for intuitionistic logic, S4, and GL, the problem was shown to be NEXPTIME-complete. For further studies on unification and admissibility of rules in intuitionistic and modal logics, in particular, the problem of finding a finite basis for admissible rules and the existence of finite complete sets of unifiers, we refer the reader to Ghilardi [2000 Ghilardi [ , 2004 , Ghilardi and Sacchetti [2004] , Iemhoff [2001 Iemhoff [ , 2003 , and Jerabek [2005] .
Unfortunately, nearly nothing has been known about the decidability status of the unification and admissibility problems for other important modal logics such as the ("nontransitive") basic logic K, various multimodal, hybrid, and description logics. In fact, only one-rather artificial-example of a decidable unimodal logic for which the admissibility problem is undecidable has been found [Chagrov 1992 ] (see also Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [1997] ).
The first main result of this article shows that for the standard modal logics K and K4 (and, in fact, all logics between them) extended with the universal modality the unification problem and, therefore, the admissibility problem are undecidable.
The universal modality, first investigated in Goranko and Passy [1992] , is regarded nowadays as a standard constructor in modal logic; see, for example, Blackburn et al. [2007] . Basically, the universal box is an S5-box whose accessibility relation contains the accessibility relations for all the other modal operators of the logic. The undecidability result formulated above also applies to those logics where the universal modality is definable, notably to propositional dynamic logic with the converse; see, for example, Harel et al. [2000] . The unification and admissibility problems for K itself still remain open. Observe that K4 is an example of a logic for which the unification and admissibility problems are decidable, but the addition of the universal modality makes them undecidable. This might be regarded as a surprising result: recall that the satisfiability problem for K4 with the universal modality can be easily reduced (in polynomial time) to the satisfiable problem for K4 itself. Given the fact that K4 is decidable in PSPACE, this shows that K4 with the universal modality is also decidable in PSPACE. Our result shows that for the unification and admissible rules problems there does not even exist a recursive reduction of K4 with the universal modality to K4. Note that, on the other hand, for "reflexive" modal logics with the universal modality such as S4, T, or Grz the unification problem is trivially decidable (see the end of Section 2).
The second result of this article shows that the unification and admissibility problems are undecidable for multimodal K and K4 (with at least two modal operators) extended with nominals.
Nominals, that is, additional variables that denote singleton sets, are one of the basic ingredients of hybrid logics; see, Areces and ten Cate [2007] and references therein. As follows from our second result, for most hybrid logics the unification and admissibility problems are undecidable.
A particularly interesting consequence of this result is in description logic. Motivated by applications in the design and maintenance of knowledge bases, Baader and Narendran [2001] and Baader and Küsters [2001] identified the unification problem for concept descriptions as an important reasoning service. In its simplest formulation, this problem is equivalent to the unification problem for modal logics (see Section 5 for more details). Baader and Narendran [2001] and Baader and Küsters [2001] developed decision procedures for certain sub-Boolean description logics, leaving the study of unification for Boolean description logics as an open research problem. It follows from our results that unification is undecidable for Boolean description logics with nominals such as ALCO, ALCQO, ALCQIO, and SHIQO. Moreover, if a Boolean description logic has transitive roles, inverse roles, and role hierarchies, then a role box can be used to define a universal role. In this case our results can be used to show the undecidability of unification relative to role boxes. This applies, for example, to the logics SHI and SHIQ. These undecidability results cover almost all Boolean description logics used in applications, in particular, the description logic underlying the OWL DL dialect of the Web Ontology Language OWL. However, the unification problem for some basic Boolean description logics such as ALC and ALCQI remains open.
The plan of this article is as follows. We start by introducing the syntax and semantics of normal modal logics with the universal modality, in particular K4 u and K u . Then we prove, using an encoding of Minsky machines, the 25:4
• F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev undecidability of the unification and admissibility problems for all logics between K4 u and K u . We also briefly discuss the formulation of this result in terms of equational theories. Then we introduce modal logics with nominals and show how to modify the proof in order to establish the undecidability of unification and admissibility for K and K4 with at least two modal operators and nominals. We close with a brief discussion of consequences for description logics with nominals.
UNIFICATION IN MODAL LOGICS WITH THE UNIVERSAL MODALITY
Let L be the propositional language with an infinite set p 0 , p 1 , . . . of propositional variables, the Boolean connectives ∧ and ¬ (and their derivatives such as ∨, →, and ⊥), and two unary modal operators and A (with their duals 3 and E ). A normal modal logic L with the universal modality A is any set of L-formulas that contains all propositional tautologies, the axioms
and is closed under modus ponens, the necessitation rules ϕ/ ϕ and ϕ/A ϕ, and uniform substitution. (So from now on we write ϕ ∈ L instead of L ϕ.) K u is the smallest normal modal logic with the universal modality. K4 u is the smallest normal modal logic with the universal modality that contains the extra axiom p → p. K u and K4 u as well as many other normal modal logics with the universal modality are determined by relational structures. A frame for L is a directed graph
, where F is a frame and V a valuation mapping the set of propositional variables to 2 W . The truth-relation (M, x) |= ϕ between points x ∈ W of M and L-formulas ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
Instead of (M, x) |= ϕ we write x |= ϕ if M is clear from the context.
A formula ϕ is valid in a frame F, F |= ϕ in symbols, if ϕ is true at every point of every model based on F. The following facts are well known (see, for example, Goranko and Passy [1992] ; Spaan [1993] ; Areces et al. [2000] ):
FACT 2.1. K u is the set of formulas that are valid in all frames. K4 u is the set of formulas that are valid in all transitive frames. The satisfiability problem is EXPTIME-complete for K u , and PSPACE-complete for K4 u .
We now formulate the unification problem for normal modal logics with the universal modality.
•
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Definition 2.2. The unification problem for a normal modal logic L with the universal modality is to decide, given a formula ϕ, whether there exists a substitution s such that s(ϕ) ∈ L. THEOREM 2.3. The unification problem for any normal modal logic between K u and K4 u is undecidable.
The proof proceeds by reduction of some undecidable configuration problem for Minsky machines.
We remind the reader that a Minsky machine (or a register machine with two registers; see, for example, Minsky [1961] ; Ebbinghaus et al. [1994] ) is a finite set (program) of instructions for transforming triples s, m, n of natural numbers, called configurations. The intended meaning of the current configuration s, m, n is as follows: s is the number (label) of the current machine state and m, n represent the current state of information. Each instruction has one of the four possible forms:
The last of them, for instance, means: transform s, m, n into t, m, n−1 if n > 0 and into t , m, n if n = 0. We assume that Minsky machines are deterministic, that is, they can have at most one instruction with a given s in the left-hand side. For a Minsky machine P, we write P : s, m, n → t, k, l if, starting with s, m, n and applying the instructions in P, in finitely many steps (possibly, in 0 steps) we can reach t, k, l . We will use the well-known fact (see, for example, Chagrov [1990] ; Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [1997] ) that there exist a Minsky program P and a configuration a = s, m, n such that no algorithm can decide, given a configuration b, whether P : a → b.
Fix such a pair P and a = s, m, n , and consider the transitive frame F = (W, R) shown in Figure 1 , where the points e (t, k, l ) 
representing the components of t, k, l , and a is the only reflexive point of F. More precisely,
(note that the last set in the union is undecidable) and R is the transitive closure of the following relation:
This frame and the formulas below describing it were introduced by A. Chagrov in order to construct undecidable modal logics and show that many 
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• F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev properties of modal logics are undecidable; see Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [1997] , Zakharyaschev et al. [2001] , and references therein.
The following variable free formulas characterize the points in F in the sense that each of these formulas, denoted by Greek letters with subscripts and/or superscripts, is true in F precisely at the point denoted by the corresponding Roman letter with the same subscript and/or superscript (and nowhere else):
where i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ≥ 0, and 3 2 ϕ = 33ϕ. It follows immediately from the definition that the formulas
are valid in all frames for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ≥ 0. We will use this property in what follows.
The formulas characterizing the points e(t, k, l ) in F are denoted by ε(t, α 1 k , α 2 l ) and defined as follows, where ϕ and ψ are arbitrary formulas: 
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We also require formulas characterizing not only fixed but arbitrary configurations with the help of the propositional variables p 1 and p 2 :
Observe that in F, under any valuation, π 1 can be true in at most one point, and this point has to be a 1 j , for some j ≥ 0. Similarly, π 2 can only be true in at most one point, and this point has to be of the form a 1 j , for some j > 0. Moreover, if π 1 is true at a 1 j , then π 2 is true in a 1 j +1 . The same applies to τ 1 and τ 2 , but with a 1 j replaced by a 2 j . Now we are fully equipped to simulate the behaviour of P on a by means of modal formulas with the universal modality.
With each instruction I in P we associate a formula Ax I by taking
if I is of the form t → t , 1, 0 ,
and finally
The formula simulating P as a whole is
PROOF OF LEMMA. We only consider Ax I = E ε(t, π 1 , τ 1 ) → E ε(t , π 2 , τ 1 ) for I = t → t , 1, 0 and leave the remaining cases to the reader.
Suppose that, for some model M = (F, V) and some x 0 from the domain W of F, we have (M, x 0 ) |= E ε(t, π 1 , τ 1 ). Then there is a point x ∈ W such that x |= ε(t, π 1 , τ 1 ), and so, by the definition of ε(t, π 1 , τ 1 ), there are three immediate successors x 0 , x 1 , x 2 of x in F such that
But then, as we observed above, x 0 = a 0 t , x 1 = a 1 k , and x 2 = a 2 l , for some k, l < ω. It follows that x = e(t, k, l ) is an element of W . By the definition of W , we obtain that P : s, m, n → t, k, l . As t → t , 1, 0 is an instruction of P, we then have P : s, m, n → t , k + 1, l , and so e(t , k + 1, l ) ∈ W . And since a 
e., the minimal normal modal logic containing both L and Ax P ) is undecidable. Indeed, we have E ε(t, α
, and only if, P : s, m, n → t, k, l . A. Chagrov used logics of this sort to prove that various properties of (finitely axiomatizable) modal logics (say, consistency of extensions of K u ) are undecidable; see, for example, Chagrov [1990] , Zakharyaschev et al. [2001] , and references therein. Now, for each b = t, k, l , consider the formula
which, intuitively, says that starting with the configuration a = s, m, n and using the instructions of P, encoded by means of Ax P , we can reach b.
PROOF OF LEMMA. (⇐) Suppose that P : a → b. Then, by the construction of the frame F above, we have
(⇒) Conversely, suppose that P : a → b. Our aim is to find a substitution s for the variables p 1 and p 2 such that s(ψ(b)) ∈ K u or, in other words, that G |= s(ψ(b)) for an arbitrary frame G, which, in general, has nothing to do with P or a. To understand what such a substitution s should do, assume that
be the computation of P starting with a and ending with b, where I j is the instruction from P that is used to transform
). Suppose for definiteness that I i = t i → t i+1 , 1, 0 . Then in order to refute the axiom (t i , π 1 , τ 1 ) ) and G |= s(E ε(t i+1 , π 2 , τ 1 )). We are now in a position to define s.
Consider the formula
which "says" that the computation is simulated properly up to the ith step, but there is no point representing the i + 1st configuration. Observe that the formula
is valid for all i = j . In other words, if defect i is true at some point in a model, then defect j does not hold at any point in the model, for i = j .
Define the substitution s we need by taking
where
(Here the case distinction is needed because of the "subtracting" instructions like I = t → t , −1, 0 ( t , 0, 0 ) and the corresponding axioms Ax I .) We show now that G |= s(ψ(b)) for all frames G, which clearly means that s(ψ(b)) ∈ K u .
Suppose G = (W, R) is given. As all formulas considered below, in particular s(ψ(b)), are variable free, we can write x |= ψ to say that ψ is true at x in some/all models based on G. Moreover, for any Boolean combination ψ of such formulas starting with E , we have x |= ψ iff x |= ψ, for any x, x ∈ W . Hence, G |= ψ means that x |= ψ for all x ∈ W .
Let us now proceed with the proof. Two cases are possible.
CLAIM 2.7. For all z ∈ W , we have
Hence, by (4) and (1),
Hence, by (4), But, according to (1), the latter formula is equivalent to the definition of α 1 k i +1 , which proves the claim. We now make a case distinction according to the rule I i+1 used to transform
Case 1: I i+1 = t i → t i+1 , 1, 0 . Our aim is to show that (a) G |= s (E ε(t i , π 1 , τ 1 )) and (b) G |= s(E ε(t i+1 , π 2 , τ 1 )), for then we would have G |= s(Ax P ), and so G |= s(ψ(b)).
By Claim 2.7, we then have
which means that z |= s(ε(t i , π 1 , τ 1 )), and so G |= s(E ε(t i , π 1 , τ 1 )).
By Claims 2.7 and 2.8, we then have
and α l i = α l i+1 , that is, we have
, and so
), contrary to G |= defect i .
Case 2: I i+1 is of the form t i → t i+1 , −1, 0 ( t i+1 , 0, 0 ). Suppose first that k i = 0, that is, the actual instruction is I i+1 = t i → t i+1 , 0, 0 . We need to show that (a) G |= s(E ε(t i , α 1 0 , τ 1 )) and (b) G |= s(E ε(t i+1 , α 1 0 , τ 1 )), which, as before, would imply G |= s(ψ(b)). 
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Thus we have x |= s(E ε(t i , α 1 0 , τ 1 )). (b) is proved similarly and left to the reader. Suppose now that k i > 0, that is, the instruction I i+1 = t i → t i+1 , −1, 0 was actually used. This time we need to show that
Clearly, it is sufficient to show that
Observe that in this case α
. So it remains to use Claims 2.7 and 2.8.
By Claim 2.7, this implies
, which leads to a contradiction, because α
and α l i = α l i+1 , and therefore we must have
). The remaining two types of instructions (where the third component changes) are dual to the ones considered above. We leave these cases to the reader.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.6. Theorem 2.3 follows immediately in view of the choice of P and α.
Observe that Theorem 2.3 can be proved for multimodal K u and K4 u as well. In this case, in the frame F considered above, the additional operators can be interpreted by the empty relation. By a proper modification of the frame F in Figure 1 , this theorem can also be extended to some logics above K4 u , for example, GL u .
Definition 2.9. The admissibility problem for inference rules for a normal modal logic L with the universal modality is to decide, given an inference rule Minor modifications of the proof above can be used to prove undecidability of the unification and admissibility problems for various modal logics in which the universal modality is definable and which, besides the universal modality, have sufficient expressive power to reason about arbitrary (or at least transitive) relations. An interesting example is PDL with the converse, that is, the extension of propositional dynamic logic with the converse constructor for programs: if α is a program, then α −1 is a program which is interpreted by the converse of the relation interpreting α. (We do not provide detailed definitions of the syntax and semantics here but refer the reader to Harel et al. [2000] .) The undecidability proof for the unification problem (for substitutions instead of propositional variables rather than atomic programs!) is carried out by taking an atomic program α and replacing, in the proof above, the operator with [α] and the universal modality A with [(α ∪ α −1 ) * ]. It seems worth mentioning, however, that the unification problem is trivially decidable for any normal modal logic L with ¬ ⊥ ∈ L. To see this, recall that a substitution s is called ground if it replaces each propositional variable by a variable free formula (that is, a formula constructed from ⊥ and only). Obviously, it is always the case that if there exists a substitution s such that s(ϕ) ∈ L, then there exists a ground substitution s with s (ϕ) ∈ L. But if ¬ ⊥ ∈ L, then there are, up to equivalence in L, only two different variable free formulas, namely, ⊥ and . Thus, to decide whether a formula ϕ is unifiable in L it is sufficient to check whether any of the ground substitutions makes ϕ equivalent to (which can be done in Boolean logic). A well-known example of such a logic is S4 u , S4 with the universal modality. Note that the admissibility problem for S4 u might nevertheless be undecidable. We leave this as an interesting open problem.
UNIFICATION MODULO EQUATIONAL THEORIES
The results presented above can be reformulated as undecidability results for the well-known notion of unification modulo equational theories [Baader and Siekmann 1994; Baader and Snyder 2001] .
Consider the equational theory BAO 2 of Boolean algebras with operators 1 and 2 , which consists of an axiomatisation BA of the variety of Boolean algebras (say, in the signature with the binary connective ∧, unary connective ¬, and constant 1) together with the equations i (x ∧ y) = i x ∧ i y and i 1 = 1, for i = 1, 2. Let T be any set of equations over the signature of Boolean algebras with two operators. Then the unification problem modulo BAO 2 ∪ T is to decide, given an equation t 1 = t 2 over the signature of BAO 2 , whether there exists a substitution s such that 
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• 25:13 that is, whether there exists a substitution s such that the equation s(t 1 ) = s(t 2 ) is valid in all algebras where the equations in BAO 2 ∪ T hold true. For a term t, let t p denote the propositional modal formula that is obtained from t by replacing its (individual) variables with (mutually distinct) propositional variables. We may assume that · p is a bijection between the terms t over the signature of BAO 2 and the modal formulas with modal operators 1 and 2 . Denote by · − p the inverse of this function. It is well known (see, e.g., Venema [2007] ) that a modal formula ϕ is valid in the smallest normal modal logic L containing the formulas
if, and only if, ϕ − p is valid in all algebras validating BAO 2 ∪ T . The appropriate converse statement is also easily formulated. It follows that the unification problem modulo BAO 2 ∪ T is decidable if, and only if, the unification problem for L is decidable. Now, let UDISC be the following set of inequalities (saying, in algebraic terminology, that the equational theory has a unary discriminator term 1 ):
Then, as a consequence of Theorem 2.3, we obtain the following result: THEOREM 3.1. The unification problem modulo BAO 2 ∪ UDISC is undecidable.
However, it remains an open question whether the unification problem modulo BAO 2 is decidable.
UNIFICATION IN MODAL LOGICS WITH NOMINALS
Let us now consider the extension of the language L with nominals. More precisely, denote by H 2 the propositional language constructed from -an infinite list p 1 , p 2 , . . . of propositional variables and -an infinite list n 1 , n 2 , . . . of nominals using the standard Boolean connectives and two modal operators and h (instead of and A in L).
1 H 2 -formulas are interpreted in frames of the form F = (W, R, S) where R, S ⊆ W × W . As before, a model is a pair M = (F, V), where V is a valuation function that assigns to each p i a subset V( p i ) of W and to each n i a singleton subset V(n i ) of W . The truth-relation, (M, x) |= ϕ, is defined as above with two extra clauses:
Denote by K H 2 the set of all H 2 -formulas that are valid in all frames, and denote by K H 2 ⊕ 45 the set of H 2 -formulas that are valid in all frames (W, R, S) FACT 4.1. The satisfiability problem for both K H 2 and K H 2 ⊕ 45 is PSPACEcomplete.
A substitution s for H 2 is a map from the set of propositional variables into H 2 . In particular, any substitution leaves nominals intact.
2 The unification and admissibility problems for modal logics with nominals are formulated in exactly the same way as before. THEOREM 4.2. The unification problem and, therefore, the admissibility problem for any logic L between K H 2 and K H 2 ⊕ 45 is undecidable.
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3. Here we only show how to modify the encoding of Minsky machine computations from Section 2. The main difference is that now the language does not contain the universal modality which can refer to all points in the frame in order to say, for example, that a certain configuration is (not) reachable. To overcome this problem, we will use one nominal, let us call it n, which, if accessible from a point x (via R and S), will be forced to be accessible from all points located within a certain distance from x. This trick will provide us with a "surrogate" universal modality which behaves, locally, similarly to the standard one.
From now on we will be using the following abbreviation, where ϕ is an H 2 -formula:
The defined operator E will play the role of our surrogate universal diamond. Consider again a Minsky program P and a configuration a = s, m, n such that it is undecidable, given a configuration b, whether P : a → b. The frame F = (W, R, S) encoding F and a is defined as in Figure 1 , with S = W × W . For each instruction I , we introduce the formula Ax I in precisely the same way as before, with E defined by (5).
The first important difference between the two constructions is the definition of Ax P . Let Nom denote the conjunction of all H 2 -formulas of the form
where M is any sequence of and h of length ≤ 6, and M is any sequence of 3 and 3 h of length ≤ 6. To explain the meaning of Nom, consider a model (G, V) based on some frame G = (W, R, S). Let x 0 ∈ W . We say that x ∈ W is of distance ≤ m from x 0 if there exists a sequence
where S = R ∪ S and 0 ≤ k ≤ m. Now assume that x 0 |= Nom. Then either all points of distance ≤ 6 from x 0 "see" V(n) via S, or no point of distance ≤ 6 from x 0 sees V(n) via S. In particular, x 0 |= E ϕ if, and only if, x |= E ϕ for all x • 25:15 of distance ≤ 6 from x 0 , and x 0 |= E ϕ if, and only if, x |= E ϕ for all x of distance ≤ 6 from x 0 .
The formula simulating P as a whole in this case is
Consider the frame F = (W, R, S) in Figure 1 (with S = W × W ). Then, no matter which singleton set interprets n, the new operator E is always interpreted by the universal relation. Hence, as before we have F |= Ax P . Now, for each b = t, k, l consider (as before) the formula
PROOF OF LEMMA. The proof of (⇐) is exactly as before.
(⇒) Suppose that P : a → b. Define a substitution s in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 2.6. More precisely, let
be the computation of P starting with a and ending with b. Then we define s by means of (3), where defect i is given by (2).
We have to show that s(ψ(b)) ∈ K H 2 , or, in other terms, that for all frames G, we have G |= s(ψ(b)). Note that now we cannot assume that E is interpreted by the universal relation.
Suppose that we are given a frame G = (W, R, S), a valuation V in it, and some x 0 ∈ W . We write {n V } for V(n), and x |= ψ for (G, V, x) |= ψ. As before, two cases are possible. 
(Observe that s( p 1 ) occurs within the scope of 3. Hence, we obtain this equivalence only for points of distance ≤ 5 from x 0 .) But this is equivalent to x |= α 1 k i .
• 25:17 admissibility problem is actually undecidable for K 2 . Unfortunately, the proof does not work in this case because χ may hold at an unbounded number of points of a frame, which makes it impossible to define the "local surrogate" E .
APPLICATIONS TO DESCRIPTION LOGICS
In this section, we briefly comment on the consequences of our results in the context of description logics [Baader et al. 2003 ]. We remind the reader that description logics (DLs, for short) are knowledge representation and reasoning formalisms in which complex concepts are defined in terms of atomic concepts using certain constructors. DLs are then used to represent and reason about various relations between such complex concepts (typically, the subsumption relation). The basic Boolean description logic ALC has as its constructors the Boolean connectives and the universal restriction ∀r, which, for a concept C and a binary relation symbol r, gives the concept ∀r.C containing precisely those objects x from the underlying domain for which y ∈ C whenever xr y. The language of ALC is a notational variant of the basic modal logic K with infinitely many modal operators: propositional variables correspond to atomic concepts, while ∀r.C is interpreted in a relational structure in the same way as r (the modal box interpreted by the accessibility relation r). We refer the reader to Baader et al. [2003] for precise definitions and a discussion of the syntax and semantics of ALC and other description logics.
It has been argued in Baader and Narendran [2001] that for many applications of DLs it would be useful to have an algorithm capable of deciding, given two complex concepts C 1 and C 2 , whether there exists a substitution s (of possibly complex concepts in place of atomic ones) such that s(C 1 ) is equivalent to s(C 2 ) in the given DL. 3 We call this problem the concept unification problem. A typical application of such an algorithm is as follows. In many cases, knowledge bases (ontologies) based on DLs are developed by different knowledge engineers over a long period. It can therefore happen that some concepts which, intuitively, should be equivalent, are introduced several times with slightly different definitions. To detect such redundancies, one can check whether certain concepts can be unified. Unifiability does not necessarily mean that these concepts have indeed been defined to denote the same class of objects-but this fact can serve as an indicator of a possible redundancy, so that the knowledge engineer could then "double check" the meaning of those concepts and change the knowledge base accordingly.
The concept unification problem for ALC is easily seen to be equivalent to the unification problem for the modal logic K with infinitely many modal operators: formulated for the modal language, the problem is to decide whether, given two modal formulas ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 , there exists a substitution s such that, for every Kripke model M and every point x in it, (M, x) |= s(ϕ 1 ) iff (M, x) |= s(ϕ 2 ).
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• F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev This is obviously equivalent to the validity of s(ϕ 1 ↔ ϕ 2 ). Baader and Küsters [2001] and Baader and Narendran [2001] developed decision procedures for the concept unification problem for a number of sub-Boolean DLs, that is, DLs which do not have all the Boolean connectives as constructors and are, therefore, either properly less expressive than ALC or incomparable with ALC. The investigation of the concept unification problem for Boolean DLs, that is, ALC and its extensions, is left as an open research problem.
It should be clear that we have to leave open the decidability status for the concept unification problem for ALC as well. However, it does follow from the result of the previous section that the unification problem for extensions of ALC with nominals is undecidable. In contemporary description logic research and applications, nominals play a major role; see for example, Horrocks and Sattler [2005] and references therein. The smallest description logic containing ALC and nominals is known as ALCO, and by extending the mapping between modal and description languages indicated above, one can see that ALCO is a straightforward notational variant of the modal logic with infinitely many modal operators and nominals. Therefore, as a consequence of Theorem 4.2 we obtain the following: THEOREM 5.1. The concept unification problem for ALCO is undecidable.
Moreover, the undecidability proof goes through as well for extensions of ALCO such as, for example, ALCQO and SHIQO, the description logic underlying the OWL DL dialect of the Web Ontology Language OWL [Horrocks et al. 2003 ].
Another family of description logics for which the concept unification problem turns out to be undecidable are those extensions of ALC where the universal role is definable. The minimal description logic of this sort, widely used in DL applications, is known nowadays as SHI. Originally, Horrocks and Sattler [1999] introduced this logic under the name ALCHI R + . In SHI, the signature of ALC is extended by -infinitely many relation symbols, which are interpreted by transitive relations, -and for each relation symbol r, there is a relation symbol r − , which is interpreted by the inverse of the interpretation of r.
The concept unification problem for SHI remains open. However, when considering SHI it is not the concept unification problem one is mainly interested in, but its generalization to the concept unification relative to role axioms 4 : in SHI and its extensions one can state in a so-called RBox (role box) that the interpretation of a relation symbol r is included in the interpretation of a relation symbol s, in symbols r s. Now, SHI concepts C and D are called unifiable relative to an RBox R iff there exists a substitution s (of complex SHI-concepts for atomic ones) such that s(C) is equivalent to s(D) in every model satisfying This undecidability proof also goes through for extensions of SHI such as, for example, SHIN and SHIQ.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have shown that for two standard constructors of modal logic-the universal modality and nominals-the unification and admissibility problems are undecidable. It follows that both unification and admissibility are undecidable for all standard hybrid logics and many of the most frequently employed description logics.
Many intriguing problems remain open. The question whether the unification and admissibility problems for K and multimodal K (or, equivalently, ALC) are decidable is still one of the major open problems in modal and description logic.
